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Government Governance and the Need to 
Reconcile Government Regulation with 
Board Fiduciary Duties 
Lisa M. Fairfax† 
“As our nation works its way through this crisis, and we 
look for explanations as to how we reached this point and how 
to avoid another crisis in the future, let us keep in mind that a 
significant set of checks and balances—ultimately ending with 
the boards of directors—has failed.” 
—John Schnatter1 
 
“It is a board’s responsibility to oversee management and to 
ensure a company’s long-term survival. . . . With the tumbling 
and collapse of dozens of major financial and other institutions, 
can we draw any conclusion other than that those directors ut-
terly failed in this regard?” 
—Carl Icahn2 
 
In light of corporate directors’ clear responsibility to moni-
tor the corporation and its managers, corporate governance 
scandals inevitably raise concerns about the extent to which di-
rectors may have failed in that responsibility.3 Corporate stat-
utes require that corporations be managed by or under the di-
 
†  Leroy Sorenson Merrifield Professor of Law, George Washington Uni-
versity Law School. Special thanks to Brett McDonnell as well as the organiz-
ers and participants in the Minnesota Law Review conference on Government 
Ethics and Bailouts who provided invaluable feedback and commentary on 
earlier versions of this draft. All errors, of course, are mine. Copyright © 2011 
by Lisa M. Fairfax. 
 1. John Schnatter, Where Were the Boards?, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 2008, 
at A11. 
 2. Carl C. Icahn, Corporate Boards that Do Their Job, WASH. POST, Feb. 
16, 2009, at A15. 
 3. See id.; Schnatter, supra note 1, at A11. 
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rection of the board of directors.4 Boards, therefore, have an ob-
ligation to monitor corporate affairs, ensuring that corporate 
managers act in the best interests of the corporation, and that 
such managers do not misbehave or otherwise shirk their du-
ties.5 When managers engage in fraud or other corporate mis-
deeds, that engagement raises questions regarding whether 
and to what extent directors failed to effectively exercise their 
monitoring obligation.6  
Corporate governance reforms strive to shore up directors’ 
roles, not only seeking to ensure that boards have sufficient in-
centives to engage in effective oversight, but also aiming to en-
sure that boards are held accountable for their oversight fail-
ures.7 The newest wave of reforms is no exception. The current 
financial crisis not only ushered in an era of significant gov-
ernment entanglement in the financial system, it also generat-
ed significant government involvement in corporate governance 
matters.8 That involvement ranged from the government be-
coming a shareholder of major corporations to the passage of a 
 
 4. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (Supp. 2010); MODEL BUS. 
CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (2009). 
 5. See Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorp. v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369–70 
(Del. 2006) (discussing oversight duty and liability); In re Caremark Int’l Inc. 
Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 968–70 (Del. Ch. 1996) (noting that directors’ 
fiduciary duty encompasses a duty to monitor); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 
8.30(b) (2009) (noting that directors must devote attention to their oversight 
function). 
 6. See Icahn, supra note 2, at A15; Schnatter, supra note 1, at A11 (“Be-
hind the CEO of every . . . Bear Stearns or Lehman Brothers who led their 
company down a path toward financial ruin, there was a board of directors 
that sat by silently and let it happen.”). 
 7. See Lisa M. Fairfax, Form Over Substance? Officer Certification and 
the Promise of Enhanced Personal Accountability Under the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2002); Eric M. Fogel & Andrew Geier, Stran-
gers in the House: Rethinking Sarbanes-Oxley and the Independent Board of 
Directors, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 33, 34 (2007); Brian Kim, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 40 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 235, 236–37 (2003); G20 Statement on Strengthening Fi-
nancial System, REUTERS, Sept. 5, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/2009/09/05/g20-finance-financial-text-idUSL566412820090905 (noting a 
need for governance reforms that create better oversight and more appropriate 
levels of accountability). 
 8. See Cheryl D. Block, Measuring the True Cost of Government Bailout, 
88 WASH. U. L. REV. 149, 156–60 (2010); Lawrence Cunningham & David Zar-
ing, The Three or Four Approaches to Financial Regulation: A Cautionary 
Analysis Against Exuberance in Crisis Response, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 39, 
56–74 (2009); Lisa M. Fairfax, The Legal Origins Theory in Crisis, 2009 BYU 
L. REV. 1571, 1590–603.  
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host of regulatory initiatives.9 Such involvement has clear im-
plications for the board of directors, increasing their responsi-
bilities in order to enhance the effectiveness of their oversight 
and thus meaningfully enhance board accountability and over-
all corporate performance.  
However, this new wave of reforms appears to impose in-
creased responsibilities on boards without reconciling those re-
sponsibilities with board functions and fiduciary law, at least 
as that law has been articulated by Delaware.10 The lack of rec-
onciliation not only represents a missed opportunity to recon-
sider boards’ proper role and function within the modern public 
corporation, but also may undermine the effectiveness of re-
forms.  
Part I of this Article pinpoints some of the key reforms that 
have implications for board fiduciary duties.11 Part II and Part 
III then demonstrate what appears to be a fundamental dis-
connection between board reforms, on the one hand, and exist-
ing board structures and fiduciary law presumably necessary to 
support those reforms, on the other. Part II discusses this dis-
connection as it relates to existing board structures. First, Part 
II illustrates the manner in which the reforms may overburden 
boards in ways that not only may set them up for failure, but 
also may increase the likelihood that boards will engage in the 
sort of rubber stamping of managerial and agent decisions that 
reforms were aimed at counteracting. In this regard, Part II ar-
 
 9. See Block, supra note 8, at 156–60; Cunningham & Zaring, supra note 
8, at 56–74; Fairfax, supra note 8, at 1590–603; J.W. Verret, Treasury, Inc.: 
How the Bailout Reshapes Corporate Theory and Practice, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 
283, 294–99 (2010). 
 10. See infra Parts II and III. This Article focuses on Delaware in light of 
its place of clear dominance in corporate law. See Brett McDonnell, Two 
Cheers for Corporate Law Federalism, 30 J. CORP. L. 99, 100 (2004) (noting the 
dominance of Delaware in corporate law); Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Politics, 
118 HARV. L. REV. 2491, 2493 (2005) (“Delaware makes the state corporate 
law governing most large American corporations.”); DEL. DIVISION CORP., 
http://corp.delaware.gov/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2011) (indicating that more than 
fifty percent of all public companies and sixty-three percent of Fortune 500 
companies are chartered in Delaware). 
 11. As a result of the financial crisis, the government became a share-
holder in many public companies, gaining the ability to select directors and 
otherwise directly intervene in boards and corporate affairs. See Verret, supra 
note 9, at 294–99. Although this direct intervention has clear implications for 
boards and their fiduciary duties, see id. at 304–07 (discussing potential con-
flicts of interest raised by government ownership in public companies as well 
as ways in which government may be pressuring corporations), this Article 
does not analyze those implications. Instead, this Article focuses on the man-
ner in which government regulations impact boards and fiduciary duties.  
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gues that the reforms may reflect unrealistic expectations 
about boards and their capacity. Second, Part II illustrates how 
the reforms may raise serious concerns about whether we can 
expect directors to have the expertise to tackle their new re-
sponsibilities, undermining the potential effectiveness of those 
reforms and once again increasing the likelihood that boards 
will unduly rely on managers or outsiders in a manner that 
could undermine their effectiveness.  
Part III demonstrates the manner in which reforms may be 
incompatible with fiduciary duty norms. Those norms, at least 
as articulated under Delaware law, currently impose a relative-
ly low risk of any personal liability for directors who may run 
afoul of their new responsibilities, particularly with respect to 
risk oversight and compensation.12 Part III, therefore, main-
tains that reforms raise questions about whether we can expect 
fiduciary duty law to hinder or support boards’ enhanced obli-
gations. Part IV offers some concluding assessments.  
I.  THE GOVERNMENT’S ROLE IN GOVERNANCE 
REFORM   
The financial crisis created the perception that the corpo-
rate governance apparatus had generated an environment 
whereby directors and officers felt free to engage in risky be-
havior without fear of repercussions from shareholders or other 
corporate constituents.13 Federal reforms seek to alter this en-
vironment.14 Specifically, those reforms seek to enhance boards’ 
monitoring role as well as our ability to hold boards accounta-
ble for failing to fulfill that role.15 This Part will discuss three 
areas in which the government has intruded on corporate gov-
ernance matters in ways that have implications for boards and 
their fiduciary responsibilities. That discussion will explore ex-
ecutive compensation, risk oversight, and shareholder rights. 
 
 12. See infra Parts II and III. 
 13. See Charles E. Schumer, Press Release, Schumer, Cantwell Announce 
Shareholder Bill of Rights to Impose Greater Accountability on Corporate 
America (May 19, 2009), in 41ST ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES 
REGULATION 1093, 1095 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice, Course Handbook 
Ser. No. 1773, 2009). 
 14. See id. 
 15. See id.  
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A. EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 
In recent years, public outrage over large executive com-
pensation packages, including bonuses and exit-pay arrange-
ments, has increased.16 That outrage appeared to reach a fever 
pitch in the midst of the financial crisis, particularly with re-
spect to companies at which executive pay increased while prof-
its and stock prices plummeted, or when companies paid execu-
tives significant salaries and bonuses while receiving 
government aid.17 Disgruntled shareholders as well as the gen-
eral public insisted that there needed to be a tighter connection 
between executive pay and corporate performance.18 The public 
also expressed concern that executive compensation structures 
may have contributed to the financial crisis by incentivizing 
corporate managers to take unnecessary risk.19  
In the face of this increased public outcry, the federal gov-
ernment has played a particularly aggressive role in regulating 
executive compensation.20 That role has implicated a host of is-
sues. This section will focus on four issues: say-on-pay, golden 
parachutes, incentive awards and clawbacks, and compensation 
committees. This section will conclude with a discussion re-
garding the impact of these issues on board responsibilities.  
1. Say-on-Pay 
Much of the efforts to curtail executive pay have coalesced 
around the campaign to secure “say-on-pay”—a nonbinding 
 
 16. See, e.g., LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT 
PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 1, 
27–31 (2004); Michael B. Dorff, Confident Uncertainty, Excessive Compensa-
tion and the Obama Plan, 85 IND. L.J. 491, 492 (2010); Polls Find Strong 
Populist Mood in Europe and to a Lesser Extent in the USA, HARRIS 
INTERACTIVE, tbl.4 (July 25, 2007), http://www.harrisinteractive.com/vault/ 
Harris-Interactive-Poll-Research-FT-Globalization-2007-07.pdf (revealing that 
seventy-seven percent of Americans believe that executives are overpaid). For 
the debate over the extent to which executive compensation can be classified 
as excessive, see Dorff, supra, at 493 n.7. 
 17. See Kenneth R. Davis, Taking Stock—Salary and Options Too: The 
Looting of Corporate America, 69 MD. L. REV. 419, 419–23 (2010). 
 18. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 16. 
 19. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 
98 GEO. L.J. 247, 249 (2010); Frederick Tung, Pay for Banker Performance: 
Structuring Executive Compensation for Risk Regulation (Emory Pub. Law 
Working Paper Series, Paper No. 10-93, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1546229. 
 20. See Dorff, supra note 16, at 529–51; David I. Walker, The Challenge of 
Improving the Long-Term Focus of Executive Pay, 51 B.C. L. REV. 435, 455–56 
(2010).  
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vote on executives’ compensation packages.21 Shareholders 
have actively encouraged corporations to adopt say-on-pay, and 
several corporations have voluntarily done so.22 Then too, al-
though they were never implemented, several federal bills in-
corporated say-on-pay requirements.23  
Say-on-pay advocates argue that shareholders’ advisory 
vote will curb excessive compensation, increasing the likelihood 
that corporations will more closely align such compensation 
with corporate performance.24 In the United Kingdom, where 
such votes have been required since 2002, say-on-pay appears 
to have created such an alignment, at least with respect to 
more closely linking pay to performance at poorly performing 
companies.25  
Critics of say-on-pay contend that these results will not be 
replicated in the United States26 Critics also argue that the 
United Kingdom experience reveals troubling pay trends.27 
Such trends include an undue reliance on best practices, which 
may lead to ineffective compensation policies,28 as well as the 
failure of say-on-pay to significantly curtail the overall growth 
 
 21. In 2009, say-on-pay was the most prevalent shareholder proposal 
submitted. See 2009 Proxy Season Scorecard, RISKMETRICS GROUP (Dec. 15, 
2009), http://www.riskmetrics.com/knowledge/proxy_season_watchlist_2009; see 
also Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Say on Pay”: Cautionary Notes on the U.K. Experience 
and the Case for Shareholder Opt-In, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 323, 339–40 
(2009) (describing shareholder efforts to advance say-on-pay proposals). 
 22. See Andrew C.W. Lund, Say on Pay’s Bundling Problems, 99 KY. L.J. 
119, 122 (2010).  
 23. As early as 2007, bills in the House and Senate sought mandatory say-
on-pay. See, e.g., Shareholder Vote on Executive Compensation Act, H.R. 1257, 
110th Cong. (2007), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/pdf/ 
HR1257BillText.pdf; Shareholder Vote on Executive Compensation Act, S. 
1181, 110th Cong. (2007), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext 
.xpd?bill=s110-1181. Similarly, in 2009 there were House and Senate bills in-
corporating say-on-pay proposals. See, e.g., Shareholder Bill of Rights Act of 
2009, S. 1074, 111th Cong. (2009), available at http://law.du.edu/documents/ 
corporate-governance/legislation/bill-text-shareholders-bill-of-rights-act-of-2009 
.pdf; Shareholder Empowerment Act of 2009, H.R. 2861, 111th Cong. (2009), 
available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-2861. 
 24. See Gordon, supra note 21, at 336–40. 
 25. See Fabrizio Ferri & David Maber, Say on Pay Votes and CEO Com-
pensation: Evidence from the United Kingdom (Oct. 15, 2010) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1420394.  
 26. See Gordon, supra note 21, at 352–53. 
 27. See infra notes 28–29. 
 28. See Stephen Davis, Does ‘Say on Pay’ Work? Lessons on Making CEO 
Compensation Accountable, in DIRECTORS’ INSTITUTE ON CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 37, 55 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. 
No. B-1622, 2007); Gordon, supra note 21, at 351–52.  
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in compensation.29 Empirical evidence from the United King-
dom also indicates that say-on-pay has not increased the con-
nection between pay and performance at well-performing com-
panies.30 In this regard, critics question whether say-on-pay 
will have a positive impact on executive compensation, while 
insisting that the complexity of compensation decisions are bet-
ter left to the board.31  
Despite these concerns, there has been considerable mo-
mentum behind say-on-pay, which has translated into imple-
mentation of say-on-pay at the federal level. The first such im-
plementation occurred in connection with the federal 
government’s program to provide federal assistance to troubled 
companies.32 In October 2008 the federal government enacted 
the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA), which 
created a program for financially distressed companies to re-
ceive federal funds known as the Troubled Asset Relief Pro-
gram (TARP).33 In February 2009 the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act (ARRA)34 amended and extended the EESA. 
In addition to providing federal aid to troubled companies, the 
Reinvestment Act requires that companies receiving TARP 
funds comply with certain executive compensation and corpo-
rate governance standards during the period in which they are 
receiving these funds.35 Pursuant to those standards, the ARRA 
requires that companies receiving TARP funding provide 
shareholders with an annual say-on-pay vote throughout the 
period during which such companies receive funds.36  
 
 29. See Davis, supra note 28, at 49; Ferri & Maber, supra note 25, at 20; 
Gordon, supra note 21, at 344. 
 30. See Ferri & Maber, supra note 25, at 52; Lund, supra note 22, at 
127–28. 
 31. See Gordon, supra note 21, at 352–53; Lund, supra note 22, at 129–30. 
 32. See Dennis J. Block, Public Company M&A: Directors’ Fiduciary Du-
ties and Recent Developments in Corporate Control Transactions, in CONTESTS 
FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 2010: CURRENT OFFENSIVE & DEFENSIVE 
STRATEGIES IN M&A TRANSACTIONS 39, 190 (PLI Corporate Law & Policy, 
Course Handbook Ser. No. B-1786, 2010).  
 33. See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-
343, 122 Stat. 3765. 
 34. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 
123 Stat. 115. 
 35. See id. § 7001.  
 36. See id.; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury An-
nounces New Restrictions on Executive Compensation (Feb. 4, 2009), available 
at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg15.aspx.  
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In July 2010 President Obama signed into law the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-
Frank), which among other things included a host of provisions 
aimed at regulating executive compensation.37 Dodd-Frank ex-
tended the say-on-pay requirement to all public companies.38 
Dodd-Frank not only requires public companies to provide their 
shareholders with a say-on-pay vote at least once every three 
years, but also requires such companies to provide shareholders 
with a nonbinding vote on whether the company should hold a 
say-on-pay vote every one, two, or three years.39  
2. Golden Parachutes 
Public concern over executive compensation encompassed 
concerns regarding golden parachute payments.40 Golden para-
chutes refer to compensation paid at an executive’s departure, 
particularly when the executive’s departure results from a 
change of control at the company.41 One package that especially 
fueled public outcry was the $210 million exit payment received 
by Home Depot’s chief executive officer (CEO) during a time 
when the company had its smallest increase in net income in 
nine years.42 Critics pointed to this payment not only as an ex-
ample of an excessive golden parachute, but also as an example 
of the failure to link pay with performance.43 This kind of sev-
erance package heightened public anger over the seeming in-
appropriateness of many golden parachutes.44 
Such severance arrangements also prompted reforms 
aimed at regulating and even prohibiting such payments. 
TARP companies are required to prohibit golden parachute 
payments to senior executive officers (defined as the top five 
most highly compensated officers) and the next five most highly 
 
 37. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, §§ 951, 971, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899–900, 1915 (2010). 
 38. See id. § 951(a)(1). 
 39. See id. § 951(a)(1)–(2). 
 40. See Miriam A. Cherry & Jarrod Wong, Clawbacks: Prospective Con-
tract Measures in an Era of Excessive Executive Compensation and Ponzi 
Schemes, 94 MINN. L. REV. 368, 374 (2009); Josh Fineman, Nardelli Exit Pack-
age Called ‘Outrage,’ May Heighten Pay Debate, BLOOMBERG, Jan. 3, 2007, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aI7fAyAMAi2A. 
 41. See Richard P. Bress, Golden Parachutes: Untangling the Ripcords, 39 
STAN. L. REV. 955, 955–56 (1987); Cherry & Wong, supra note 40, at 374. 
 42. See Fineman, supra note 40. 
 43. See id. 
 44. See id. 
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compensated officers.45 Under Dodd-Frank, public companies 
must provide shareholders with disclosure on golden parachute 
arrangements made in connection with mergers and similar 
transactions, and must provide shareholders with a nonbinding 
vote on such compensation arrangements.46 
3. Incentive Awards and Clawbacks 
Public outrage over bonuses and other incentive-based 
payments also encouraged the federal government to focus on 
incentive-based compensation in a variety of ways.47 When it 
was reported that Wall Street bonuses for 2008 would exceed 
$20 billion, President Obama referred to such bonuses as 
“shameful.”48 Public ire over such bonuses spurred legislative 
reforms aimed at curtailing them. Thus, TARP companies must 
prohibit the payment of all bonuses, other than long-term re-
stricted stock.49 However, TARP exempts bonuses required to 
be paid pursuant to contracts enacted prior to federal legisla-
tion.50 Moreover, the number of employees subject to the prohi-
bition depends on the amount of financial assistance the em-
ployer received.51  
Regulations also require companies to recover bonuses in-
appropriately paid to executives. Thus, companies receiving 
TARP funding must provide for a “clawback” or recovery of bo-
nuses or other incentive-based compensation paid based on 
earnings or other criteria later proven to be materially inaccu-
rate.52 The clawback applies to senior executive officers and the 
 
 45. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 
111-5, § 7001, 123 Stat. 123, 517–18.  
 46. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 951, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899–900 (2010). 
 47. See President Barack Obama, Remarks Following a Meeting with 
Economic Advisers and an Exchange with Reporters, 2009 Daily Comp. Pres. 
Doc. 34, at 1 (Jan. 29, 2009), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD 
-200900034/pdf/DCPD-200900034.pdf. 
 48. See id. 
 49. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act § 7001. 
 50. See id. 
 51. See id. The SEC also implemented disclosure rules that alter the 
manner in which corporations must disclose stock and option awards. See 
Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334, 68,338 (Dec. 23, 2009) 
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 239–40, 249, 279). 
 52. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act § 7001. Section 304 of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) also has a clawback provision, but it is 
more limited because it applies only to the CEO or CFO, and only has a 
twelve-month look-back and recovery period. Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 304, 116 
Stat. 745, 778. As of January 2009, the SEC had not recommended any actions 
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top twenty most highly compensated executives.53 Dodd-Frank 
extended clawback provisions to all public companies, requiring 
them to implement policies to recover compensation when it is 
later shown that the compensation was based on erroneous fi-
nancial results.54 Dodd-Frank permits recovery from any cur-
rent or former executive officer who received incentive-based 
compensation during the three-year period preceding the date 
of a company’s restated financials.55 
4. Compensation Committees 
Dodd-Frank requires each public company to establish a 
compensation committee responsible for evaluating the compa-
ny’s compensation practices and policies.56 The committee must 
be comprised solely of independent directors.57 To be sure, the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and NASDAQ already re-
quire public company compensation committees to be com-
prised of independent directors.58 In this regard, Dodd-Frank 
may be viewed as codifying preexisting listing requirements in 
this area. However, the new rules reflect concern that stock ex-
change independence standards did not go far enough and, 
hence, such rules seek to increase the criteria for determining 
independence.59 Dodd-Frank also specifically enables compen-
sation committees to hire their own counsel and an independ-
ent compensation consultant.60  
 
to require repayment pursuant to section 304, and SOX does not provide for a 
private right of action. See Linda E. Rappaport, Hot Issues in Executive Com-
pensation and Corporate Governance, in PREPARATION OF ANNUAL 
DISCLOSURE DOCUMENTS 2009, at 717, 731 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice, 
Course Handbook Ser. No. B-1710, 2010). For an intriguing discussion of how 
clawbacks can be used to more closely align compensation with shareholders’ 
long-term interests, see Cherry & Wong, supra note 40, at 410–22. 
 53. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act § 7001. 
 54. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 954, 124 Stat. 1376, 1904 (2010). 
 55. See id. 
 56. See id. § 952. 
 57. See id. 
 58. See NYSE, INC., NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.03 (compen-
sation committee); NASDAQ, INC., NASD MANUAL RULES § 4350(c) (compen-
sation and nominating committees).  
 59. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Fact Sheet: Administra-
tion’s Regulatory Reform Agenda Moves Forward: New Independence for 
Compensation Committees (July 16, 2009), available at http://www.treasury 
.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg218.aspx. 
 60. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
§ 952(c)–(d). 
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5. Impact on Board Responsibilities 
The combination of reforms focused on executive compen-
sation enhances directors’ duties by requiring them to more 
closely monitor and implement corporate compensation practic-
es. Of note, Dodd-Frank states that say-on-pay votes may not 
be construed to create or imply any change or addition to the 
board’s fiduciary duties.61 Notwithstanding this statement, re-
forms focused on say-on-pay encourage boards to pay greater 
attention to executive compensation matters and shareholders’ 
preferences with respect to those matters, or risk rejection of 
the pay packages approved by the compensation committee.62 
Reforms that require disclosure of golden parachute arrange-
ments along with an advisory vote covering such arrangements 
appear to have a similar impact.63 Presumably any disclosure 
requires boards to gain a better understanding of the arrange-
ments being disclosed. Then too, the fact that the federal gov-
ernment now mandates the existence of compensation commit-
tees is likely to enhance their prominence and their 
responsibilities. Indeed, corporate governance reforms under 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX)64 essentially required 
public companies to maintain independent audit committees, 
which enhanced that committee’s role in the corporate govern-
ance landscape.65 It is likely that the focus on compensation 
committees will have a similar impact. Moreover, the compen-
sation committee bears responsibility for overseeing the im-
plementation of compensation policies.66 Thus, regulations re-
lated to prohibitions on certain forms of compensation 
arrangements, or otherwise providing for the creation of com-
pensation policies, require greater involvement by the board 
with respect to such matters.  
 
 61. Id. § 951(c)(2). 
 62. See Rebecca A. Crawford, Corporate Governance Reform: How to Pro-
mote the Long-Term Health and Value of U.S. Corporations, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & 
BUS. 905, 926 (2009). 
 63. See, e.g., Jeremy R. Delman, Structuring Say-on-Pay: A Comparative 
Look at Global Variations in Shareholder Voting on Executive Compensation, 
2010 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 583, 590. 
 64. Pub. L. No. 107-294, 116 Stat. 745. 
 65. See Bryan A. McGrane, The Audit Committee: Director Liability in the 
Wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Tello v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 18 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 575, 575 (2009). 
 66. John D. Shipman, The Future of Backdating Equity Options in the 
Wake of SEC Executive Compensation Disclosure Rules, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1194, 
1194 n.3 (2007). 
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B. RISK OVERSIGHT 
Legislators and academics alike have argued that company 
policies encouraging or rewarding imprudent risk taking con-
tributed to, if not caused, the financial meltdown.67 Important-
ly, such policies include compensation structures that may have 
enhanced excessive managerial risk taking.68 In light of the 
concern related to risk taking, a number of reforms focus on 
risk, particularly risk associated with compensation structures.  
1. Risk Evaluation and Limits 
TARP addresses risk in at least two ways. TARP recipients 
are required to impose limits on compensation to exclude incen-
tives for senior executives to take “unnecessary and excessive 
risks.”69 TARP also requires recipients to have compensation 
committees comprised solely of independent directors with re-
sponsibility for evaluating employee compensation plans to as-
sess the risk posed by such plans.70 Most public companies al-
ready had compensation committees composed of independent 
directors.71 However, TARP requirements mark the first time 
the federal government specifically directed such committees to 
focus on risk.72 These requirements mark the first time the fed-
 
 67. See Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 19, at 249; Karl S. Okamoto, Af-
ter the Bailout: Regulating Systemic Moral Hazard, 57 UCLA L. REV. 183, 185 
(2009); Karl S. Okamoto & Douglas O. Edwards, Risk Taking, 32 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 159, 159 (2010); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Statement by 
Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner on Compensation (June 10, 2009), available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg163.aspx (“At many 
firms, compensation design unintentionally encouraged excessive risk-taking, 
providing incentives that ultimately put the health of the company in dan-
ger.”); Martin Lipton et al., Risk Management and the Board of Directors, 
HARVARD L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOV. & FIN. REG. (Dec. 17, 2009, 9:33 AM), http:// 
blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2009/12/17/risk-management-and-the-board-of 
-directors-2/ (“[The] public and political perception [is] that undue risk-taking 
was central to the breakdown of the financial and credit markets.”). 
 68. See Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 19, at 249; Tung, supra note 19, 
at 2 n.2. 
 69. See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-
343, § 111, 122 Stat. 3765, 3777.  
 70. See id.  
 71. See supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text. 
 72. See The Economic Crisis: Broader Executive Compensation Reforms 
Coming Soon, K&L GATES LLP, http://www.klgates.com/newsstand/detail 
.aspx?publication=5777 (last visited Apr. 10, 2011) (noting that historically 
risk and compensation issues were managed separately by boards). 
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eral government demanded that such committees evaluate the 
compensation arrangements of all employees.73  
2. Risk Disclosure and Oversight 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) also im-
plemented enhanced risk-disclosure requirements.74 Corpora-
tions now must provide a narrative discourse about the com-
pensation policies of all employees as they relate to risk 
management and risk taking incentives if such policies create 
risks that are “reasonably likely to have a material adverse ef-
fect” on the corporation.75 The SEC’s disclosure rule not only 
includes a nonexhaustive list of examples that may trigger dis-
closure by suggesting that compensation policies may be risky, 
but also includes issues that must be addressed to the extent a 
company determines that disclosure is warranted.76 In crafting 
the rule, the SEC noted that a company may appropriately con-
clude that “its compensation policies are not reasonably likely 
to have a material adverse effect on the company” and, hence, 
do not require disclosure.77 Indeed, because the SEC only re-
quires companies to disclose policies that have a material “ad-
verse” effect, companies avoid having to discuss arrangements 
that would serve to mitigate inappropriate risk taking.78 For 
companies that conclude disclosure is not necessary, the SEC 
rule does not require them to affirmatively state that they have 
determined the risks arising from their compensation policies 
are not reasonably expected to materially impact the corpora-
tion.79  
In addition to this risk assessment, the SEC requires cor-
porations to describe the board’s role in risk oversight.80 The 
 
 73. See CLEARY GOTTLIEB STEEN & HAMILTON LLP, COMPENSATION AND 
RISK: COMPENSATION COMMITTEE ACTIONS UNDER NEW SEC RULES 1 (2009) 
[hereinafter COMPENSATION AND RISK], available at http://www.cgsh.com/files/ 
News/763d0ecc-7c1c-4174-aefa-fc354f40f67e/Presentation/NewsAttachment/472 
aa234-4cfe-48dc-bd3f-0067d4f99847/CGSH%20Alert%20-%20Compensation% 
20and%20Risk.pdf (noting that, prior to the reforms, most compensation 
committees did not review the compensation arrangements of all rank-and-file 
employees). 
 74. See Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334 (Dec. 23, 
2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 239–40, 249, 274). 
 75. See id. at 68,334. 
 76. See id. at 68,337. 
 77. See id. 
 78. See id. 
 79. See id. at 68,338. 
 80. See id. at 68,345. 
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new rule not only seeks to assess how the board administers its 
risk oversight function, but also how the board receives infor-
mation from those responsible for day-to-day risk assessment.81 
3. Impact on Board Responsibilities 
Collectively, these reforms focus boards’ attention on risk 
and risk assessment, broadening their responsibility for moni-
toring risk, particularly as it relates to compensation matters. 
Indeed, most compensation committees currently do not rou-
tinely review the compensation arrangements for all em-
ployees.82 As a result, requirements to evaluate compensation 
arrangements extending beyond the CEO and top executives 
represent a significant expansion of the committee’s duties. 
Then too, compensation committees did not necessarily review 
compensation arrangements with an eye towards evaluating 
their impact on risks.83 Hence, reforms ensure that compensa-
tion committees have a heightened level of involvement in risk 
assessment. Moreover, by mandating disclosure on board in-
volvement in risk oversight, the reforms increase the likelihood 
that boards will play a more comprehensive role in risk as-
sessment.  
C. SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS 
In the past few years, shareholder activism has increased 
as shareholders have sought to enhance their authority over di-
rector elections and corporate governance.84 Advocates of in-
creased shareholder power argue that augmenting shareholder 
rights not only will positively impact corporate performance, 
but also will enhance board and managerial accountability, 
thereby reducing incidences of misconduct and shirking.85 Op-
 
 81. See id.  
 82. See COMPENSATION AND RISK, supra note 73, at 1.  
 83. See Lipton et al., supra note 67 (noting that most boards delegate the 
risk management function to the audit committee). 
 84. See Lisa M. Fairfax, Making the Corporation Safe for Shareholder 
Democracy, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 54, 61–78 (2008). 
 85. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 
56,669 (Sept. 16, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249) (not-
ing that new proxy access rules were aimed at responding to serious concerns 
about the accountability and responsiveness of some companies and their 
boards, as well as the need to ensure that they exercise effective oversight); 
Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 835, 836 (2005); Luis A. Aguilar, SEC Comm’r, Increasing Accountability 
and Transparency to Investors, Remarks at “The SEC Speaksin 2009” (Feb. 6, 
2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch020609laa.htm 
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ponents raise considerable objections to increased power, rang-
ing from its potential to undermine board discretion necessary 
to ensure the efficient management of corporations, to concerns 
that shareholders will use their increased power to advance 
special interests or issues antithetical to the best interests of 
the corporation and the broader shareholder class.86 Despite 
these concerns, many federal reforms focus on enhancing 
shareholder power; such reforms necessarily implicate boards. 
This section will analyze three such reforms—say-on-pay, bro-
ker discretionary voting, and proxy access—and their impact on 
board responsibilities. 
1. Say-on-Pay 
As noted in Part I.A, Dodd-Frank entitles shareholders of 
public companies to have a say on executive compensation and 
golden parachutes in connection with mergers, acquisitions, or 
similar transactions.87 Say-on-pay is designed to provide 
shareholders with a voice in executive compensation decisions 
and to hold directors accountable to shareholders for the com-
pensation decisions they make.88  
2. Broker Discretionary Voting 
In July 2009 the SEC adopted a rule that eliminated bro-
ker discretionary voting for uncontested director elections.89 
Under NYSE Rule 452, if the beneficial holders of shares failed 
to provide brokers with voting instructions by the tenth day be-
fore a shareholder meeting, brokers could vote any such unin-
structed shares for “routine matters.”90 The SEC decided to 
eliminate uncontested elections from those matters classified as 
“routine,” thereby prohibiting brokers from voting uninstructed 
 
(“[S]hareholders can do a lot to align company management’s incentives with 
the public interest.”).  
 86. See Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder 
Power, 53 UCLA L. REV. 561, 577 (2006); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director 
Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1746 
(2005); William Bratton & Michael Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder 
Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 653 (2010). 
 87. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 951, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899–900 (2010).  
 88. See Gordon, supra note 21, at 337–40. 
 89. See Order Approving NYSE Proposed Rule Changes to Eliminate Bro-
ker Discretion Voting for the Election of Directors, 74 Fed. Reg. 33,293, 33,305 
(July 10, 2009). 
 90. See id. at 33,293 n.7. 
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shares in such elections.91 This rule change took effect in Janu-
ary 2010.92 Dodd-Frank codified this change and extended it to 
all national securities exchanges.93 Dodd-Frank also required 
that the SEC eliminate broker discretionary voting on compen-
sation matters and any other matter the SEC determined was 
“significant.”94 
The broker voting change could have a significant impact 
on shareholders’ voting authority. Empirical evidence reveals 
that broker discretionary voting almost always followed the ad-
vice of managers and incumbent directors, potentially distort-
ing votes in their favor.95 This evidence suggests that eliminat-
ing such voting is likely to increase shareholders’ role in 
election matters. 
3. Proxy Access 
Proxy access—the ability of shareholders to access the cor-
poration’s proxy statement for purposes of nominating their 
own candidates—is the subject of contentious debate in the 
corporate arena.96 Proponents of proxy access insist that such 
access will enhance shareholder voice and corporate accounta-
bility by ensuring that shareholders have a meaningful voice in 
board elections and, by extension, corporate affairs.97 Oppo-
nents contend that such access could have a deleterious impact 
on the corporation.98 Some argue that such access could en-
hance the number of proxy contests, thereby creating unneces-
sary costs and distraction for corporations and their boards.99 
Others contend that proxy access will enable shareholders with 
 
 91. See id. at 33,298. 
 92. See id. at 33,293 n.6. 
 93. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 957, 124 Stat. 1376, 1906 (2010). 
 94. See id. 
 95. See PROXY WORKING GRP. TO THE N.Y. STOCK EXCH., REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PROXY WORKING GROUP TO THE NEW YORK STOCK 
EXCHANGE 14 (2006), available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/PWG_REPORT.pdf. 
 96. Compare Bebchuk, supra note 85, at 836, with Bainbridge, supra note 
86, at 1746. 
 97. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 
56,761 (Sept. 16, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249). 
(noting the potential of proxy access to lead to “greater accountability on the 
part of incumbent directors to the extent they see a close link between their 
performance and the prospect of removal”); Bebchuk, supra note 85, at 836. 
 98. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. at 
56,765–66 (discussing concerns). 
 99. See id. at 56,765 (discussing concerns). 
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special interests to gain unwarranted influence over the com-
pany and its policies.100 Given the strength of views on both 
sides of this issue, shareholders have found it difficult to obtain 
proxy access.101  
The federal government has played a vital role in the proxy 
access debate. As an initial matter, in an effort to pave the way 
for a proxy access rule, Dodd-Frank specifically authorized the 
SEC to create a proxy access rule.102 This authorization reflect-
ed a direct response to those who insisted that the SEC lacked 
the authority to mandate proxy access.103 
Shortly after this authorization, the SEC approved a proxy 
access regime for the first time in its history.104 That regime 
not only requires every public company to grant proxy access to 
its shareholders, but also allows shareholders to propose addi-
tional mechanisms for gaining access to the company’s proxy 
statement.105 Under the new rules, shareholder nominees may 
be included on a corporation’s proxy statement if they (1) own 
at least three percent of the voting power of the company’s se-
curities, (2) have held such securities continuously for at least 
three years, and (3) are not holding the securities in order to 
change control of the company or gain board seats exceeding 
the maximum number required to be included under the SEC’s 
rule.106 Under the new regime, a company is not required to in-
clude more than one nominee, or the number of nominees that 
would represent up to twenty-five percent of the company’s 
board, whichever is greater.107  
In addition to mandating proxy access, the new rules 
amend the federal shareholder proposal rule to enable share-
holder proposals regarding the company’s nomination proce-
 
 100. See Bainbridge, supra note 86; Bratton & Wachter, supra note 86.  
 101. See Lisa M. Fairfax, The Future of Shareholder Democracy, 84 IND. 
L.J. 1259, 1273–79 (2009). 
 102. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 971(a)–(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1915 (2010). 
 103. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. at 
56,674. 
 104. See Neal Lipschutz, ‘Proxy Access’ Era Begins; Welcome to the Un-
known, WALL ST. J., Aug. 25, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424 
052748703632304575451892123490472.html. 
 105. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. at 
56,670. 
 106. See id. at 56,674–75. 
 107. See id. at 56,675. 
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dures to appear on the company’s proxy statement.108 The SEC 
made clear that if shareholders approve any such proposals, 
they will not supplant the mandated access rule.109 Instead, 
such proposals would represent an additional route through 
which shareholders could access the corporation’s proxy state-
ment in order to nominate candidates of their choice.110  
The proxy access rules were scheduled to take effect on 
November 15, 2010, and apply to public companies (other than 
small issuers) that had mailed their proxy statements on or af-
ter March 15, 2010.111 However, the U.S. Chamber of Com-
merce and the Business Roundtable challenged the SEC’s au-
thority to implement such rules.112 As a result, the SEC 
announced that it would delay implementation of the rules un-
til a court ruling on the suit, which is not expected until late 
spring of 2011 at the earliest.113  
Proxy access is aimed at enhancing shareholders’ nomi-
nation right and, hence, their ability to influence board elec-
tions and, by extension, corporate governance.114 Because of the 
dispersed nature of public shareholders, such shareholders typ-
ically vote by proxy—that is, they do not attend the shareholder 
meeting in person, but rather designate a representative to cast 
a vote on their behalf.115 Proxy rules require that any solicita-
tion of shareholders’ proxy be accompanied by a proxy state-
ment filed with the SEC and distributed to shareholders en-
titled to vote.116 Thus, when shareholders vote on board 
 
 108. See id. at 56,676–77. This new provision reverses a provision adopted 
by the SEC in 2007. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(8) (2010). 
 109. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. at 
56,730–31. 
 110. See id. 
 111. See Memorandum from Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati to clients of 
Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, Effective Date of Proxy Access Rules An-
nounced (Sept. 16, 2010), available at http://www.wsgr.com/publications/ 
pdfsearch/wsgralert_proxy_rules_effective_date.pdf. 
 112. See Jessica Holzer, Lawsuit Aims to Overturn Proxy Rule in Overhaul, 
WALL ST. J., Sept. 30, 2010, at C3, available at http://online.wsj.com/ 
article/SB10001424052748704116004575522151605541266.html. 
 113. See Jesse Westbrook, SEC Delays Proxy-Access Rules Amid Legal 
Challenge, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 4, 2010, 5:34 PM), http://www 
.businessweek.com/news/2010-10-04/sec-delays-proxy-access-rules-amid-legal 
-challenge.html.  
 114. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. at 
56,669–70. 
 115. See id. at 9. 
 116. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(a)(2) (2010) (distribution to shareholders); 
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6 (2010) (filing with the SEC). 
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candidates, corporations distribute a proxy statement identify-
ing the names of director-candidates.117 Currently, only man-
agement-supported candidates appear on the corporate proxy 
statement.118 As a general matter, shareholders seeking to 
nominate candidates of their choice must engage in a proxy 
contest pursuant to which they prepare and distribute their 
own separate proxy statement.119 Evidence suggests that the 
costs and other logistical hurdles associated with waging a 
proxy contest makes it prohibitive for all but a small percent-
age of shareholders.120 As a result, very few shareholders have 
the opportunity to nominate candidates of their choice.121 Thus, 
in most director elections, shareholders only vote on candidates 
supported by management and the incumbent board. Proxy 
access appears to change this dynamic, ensuring that boards 
are not simply nominating themselves, thereby increasing the 
likelihood that boards feel more accountable to shareholders.122  
4. Impact on Board Responsibilities 
Increasing shareholders rights implicates directors’ re-
sponsibilities. Reforms in this area are designed to increase the 
likelihood that directors will pay closer attention to, and be bet-
ter informed about, shareholder concerns.123 Hence, law firms 
have begun encouraging corporations to become better in-
formed about their shareholder base in the wake of proxy 
access and broker voting changes.124 Moreover, reforms that in-
 
 117. See id. § 240.14a-3 (2010). 
 118. See id. § 240.14a-8(i)(8) (2010). 
 119. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. at 56,755. 
 120. See id. at 56,755–57. 
 121. See Bebchuk, supra note 85, at 856 (discussing the relatively small 
number of proxy contests waged each year). 
 122. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. at 
56,761. 
 123. See CLEARY GOTTLEIB STEEN & HAMILTON LLP, ALERT MEMO: 
RESPONDING TO THE ELIMINATION OF BROKER DISCRETIONARY VOTING IN 
ELECTIONS OF DIRECTORS 3–5 (2009) [hereinafter RESPONDING TO BROKER 




(emphasizing the need for enhanced responsiveness to shareholder concerns). 
 124. See id. at 3 (noting the need to refocus on shareholder outreach); SEC 
Adopts Shareholder Proxy Access Rules, DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, (Aug. 30, 
2010), http://www.dorsey.com/eu_proxy_access_0830/ (noting that in the face 
of increased shareholder power, outreach and attention to shareholder rela-
tions “will be more important than ever”); Proxy Access Litigation and Next 
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crease shareholder power also increase the likelihood that di-
rectors will enhance their engagement with shareholders on a 
more routine basis. Anecdotal evidence from the United King-
dom reveals that say-on-pay has increased communications be-
tween boards and shareholders with respect to compensa-
tion.125 A similar pattern may emerge in the United States 
Additionally, anecdotal evidence in the United States suggests 
that increased shareholder activism has prompted corporations 
to meet more frequently with some of their large sharehold-
ers.126 Although directors did not historically view engagement 
with shareholders as part of their job, increased shareholder 
activism coupled with reforms aimed at giving shareholders 
greater voice, have prompted corporations to facilitate director-
shareholder communication.127 In this respect, reforms aimed 
at enhancing shareholder power may lead to a climate of more 
active engagement between shareholders and directors.128 
While such a climate may be beneficial, it certainly expands 
boards’ responsibilities.129 
 
Steps, GIBSON DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, (Oct. 8, 2010), http://www 
.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/ProxyAccessLitigationAndNextSteps.aspx 
(recommending that companies reach out to their significant shareholders, 
keep directors informed about shareholder concerns, and reach out to their en-
tire shareholder base); SEC Adopts Proxy Access Rules to Facilitate Shareholder 
Nominations of Directors, GOODWIN PROCTER LLP, (Sept. 1, 2010), http://www 
.goodwinprocter.com/Publications/Newsletters/Client-Alert/2010/SEC-Adopts 
-Proxy-Access-Rules-to-Facilitate-Shareholder-Nominations-of-Directors.aspx 
(advising corporations to get to know their large shareholders); SEC Elimi-
nates Discretionary Broker Voting for Uncontested Director Elections, WILSON 
SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI (July 15, 2009), http://www.wsgr.com/ 
wsgr/Display.aspx?SectionName=publications/PDFSearch/wsgralert_rule452_ 
amendment.htm (advising companies to get a better understanding of their 
shareholder base and potential changes to that base, and “[t]ake a more com-
prehensive, year-round” approach to director elections). 
 125. See Davis, supra note 28, at 50; Gordon, supra note 21, at 342 (noting 
the much higher level of shareholder engagement); Lund, supra note 22, at 
126–27. 
 126. See LATHAM & WATKINS LLP, DANGEROUS TALK? WHEN/HOW SHOULD 
DIRECTORS COMMUNICATE WITH SHAREHOLDERS? 2, available at http://www 
.directorsforum.org/resources/pdf/cdf_dangerous_talk_program_outline_3-18.pdf? 
ID=3.362 (describing companies’ increased engagement with shareholders). 
 127. See id. at 2–3. 
 128. See id. 
 129. See infra Part II.A. 
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II.  THE DISCONNECT BETWEEN BOARD REFORMS AND 
BOARD REALITIES   
The governmental reforms pinpointed in Part I appear to 
lose sight of at least two realities of current board structure 
that not only undermine the potential effectiveness of those re-
forms, but also highlight the need for reconsideration of the 
board’s role. This section examines three areas. First, reforms 
appear to have an unrealistic expectation about board capacity, 
potentially overburdening boards in ways that may undermine 
their ability to be effective. Second, reforms not only impose a 
myriad of new responsibilities on boards without sufficient con-
sideration of whether board members have sufficient expertise 
to effectively tackle those responsibilities, but also impose cri-
teria on directors that may undermine their expertise, increas-
ing the likelihood that boards will feel ill equipped to adequate-
ly perform their duties. Reforms also increase the likelihood 
that boards will inappropriately rely on third-party advisors 
and managers, engaging in the kind of rubber-stamping of their 
decisions reforms were aimed at combating. This section ad-
dresses each of these issues. 
A. PART-TIME JOB, FULL-TIME RESPONSIBILITIES? 
Reforms impose increasing amounts of responsibility on 
board members. Some reforms even pinpoint the number of 
meetings to be held by directors.130 For example, companies re-
ceiving TARP funding must ensure that their compensation 
committees meet at least semiannually to discuss and evaluate 
any risks associated with the company’s employee compensa-
tion plans.131 Proxy data reveals that directors spend consider-
ably more time on board matters as compared to ten or twenty 
years ago.132 Moreover, the time commitment associated with 
board service grew significantly in the wake of governance re-
forms passed under SOX.133 It seems likely that the current set 
 
 130. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 
111-5, § 7001, 123 Stat. 115, 518. 
 131. Id. 
 132. See KORN/FERRY INST., 34TH ANNUAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS STUDY 
10 (2007), available at http://www.kornferryinstitute.com/files/pdf1/Board_ 
Study07_LoRez_FINAL.pdf; SPENCER STUART, 2009 SPENCER STUART BOARD 
INDEX 8–9 (2009), available at http://content.spencerstuart.com/sswebsite/pdf/ 
lib/SSBI2009.pdf. 
 133. See KORN/FERRY INST., supra note 132, at 10. 
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of reforms will generate a similar increase in the amount of 
time directors must devote to board matters.  
However, reforms fail to reconcile this increased time 
commitment with the limited nature of board service.134 As an 
initial matter, reforms appear to lose sight of the fact that 
board membership represents a part-time position. Many re-
forms, such as those involving the compensation committee, 
impose duties on directors who are required to be independ-
ent.135 However, even when reforms do not embody such a re-
quirement, empirical data demonstrates that the vast majority 
of public company directors are independent.136 By definition, 
independent directors are people who have no employment re-
lationship with the company, which means that such directors 
often have outside engagements, including other full-time 
jobs.137 One 2007 study revealed that seventy-eight percent of 
companies have at least one active CEO or chief operating of-
ficer (COO) on the board.138 A 2009 study further revealed that 
although active CEOs, COOs, and presidents no longer domi-
nate the board, they still account for twenty-six percent of all 
new directors.139 Moreover, sixty-one percent of new directors 
are active executives or professionals.140 These statistics con-
firm that most directors have significant outside obligations, 
requiring them to balance their board responsibilities with 
these obligations. Reforms only exacerbate this difficult balanc-
ing act. 
Second, reforms do not appear to sufficiently appreciate the 
fact that boards consist of a relatively small group of people. 
The average public company board consists of ten directors, a 
number that has been virtually unchanged for at least a dec-
ade.141 However, board size has decreased significantly from its 
historical levels in which the average board contained between 
sixteen and twenty-five directors.142 In this respect, we have 
 
 134. Id. at 14. 
 135. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 952, 124 Stat. 1376, 1900–03 (2010). 
 136. See KORN/FERRY INST., supra note 132, at 4. 
 137. See Donald C. Clarke, Three Concepts of the Independent Director, 32 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 73, 84, 99–100 (2007); Usha Rodrigues, The Fetishization of 
Independence, 33 J. CORP. L. 447, 464 (2008). 
 138. KORN/FERRY INST., supra note 132, at 18 tbl.B. 
 139. SPENCER STUART, supra note 132, at 12. 
 140. See id. at 13. 
 141. See KORN/FERRY INST., supra note 132, at 4, 17 tbl.A.  
 142. See id. at 6. 
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come to expect that a smaller group of directors can carry out 
increasingly greater responsibilities.  
Third, often director responsibilities disproportionately fall 
on a particular board committee, rather than the board as a 
whole.143 In the last set of reforms, the committee experiencing 
the greatest level of enhanced responsibilities was the audit 
committee.144 Reflecting these increased responsibilities, audit 
committees saw the greatest rise in the frequency of their meet-
ings as well as the greatest rise in the time devoted to board 
matters.145 Current reforms focus significantly on the compen-
sation committee,146 which has on average three members.147 A 
2009 study revealed that compensation committees were al-
ready meeting more frequently, likely due to the increased fo-
cus on compensation matters.148 These new reforms demand an 
even greater time commitment from such committee members. 
This means that the enhanced work required of directors is ac-
tually being imposed on a small subset of the board, a subset 
already burdened with additional meetings and workloads. 
Finally, it is possible that reforms augmenting shareholder 
rights exacerbate this overburdening problem. If proxy access 
and other election related reforms increase the potential for 
election contests, they could prove distracting in ways that un-
dermine boards’ ability to fully carry out their other responsi-
bilities.149 Indeed, election contests are time-consuming and, 
thus, any spike in those contests could ensure that directors 
turn their attention away from other issues. Of course it is 
possible that legal challenges will hinder implementation of 
proxy access and, thus, the distractions associated with proxy 
access may never materialize.150 However, even without such 
access, rules aimed at increasing shareholder power inevitably 
increase board responsibilities with respect to shareholders, 
ensuring that they devote time and resources toward under-
 
 143. Cf. id. at 18 tbl.B (“[R]esponsibilities of boards specifically identified 
in the proxies and assigned to a particular committee.”). 
 144. See Lawrence Cunningham, Rediscovering Board Expertise: Legal Im-
plications of the Empirical Literature, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 465, 475–76 (2008). 
 145. See KORN/FERRY INST., supra note 132, at 18–19 tbls.C–E. 
 146. See supra Part I.A.4. 
 147. See KORN/FERRY INST., supra note 132, at 19 tbl.D. 
 148. See SPENCER STUART, supra note 132, at 7, 9. 
 149. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 
56,765 (Sept. 16, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249). 
 150. See Holzer, supra note 112, at C3. 
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standing issues of concern to the shareholder base.151 Thus, re-
forms like changes to broker discretionary voting and the in-
creased implementation of majority voting heighten the corpo-
ration’s need to identify and interact with investors.152 Indeed, 
in adopting its final proxy access rule, the SEC identified con-
cerns that “the board may incur costs in attempting to institute 
policies and procedures it believes will address shareholder 
concerns.”153  
To be sure, the observation that enhanced shareholder 
rights may involve an increased time commitment from direc-
tors does not necessarily mean that such an enhancement is 
not legitimate or otherwise worthwhile. As the SEC noted, the 
costs associated with new shareholder rights may be offset by 
the new rules themselves as well as the benefits associated 
with those rules.154  
Nonetheless, the combination of the time commitment as-
sociated with increased shareholder rights coupled with the 
time necessary to tackle directors’ new responsibilities in other 
areas does raise serious questions about board capacity. Impor-
tantly, are we asking too much of the relatively small pool of 
part-time directors tasked with these new responsibilities? New 
reforms do not answer that question, thereby failing to fully 
reconcile the duties imposed on boards with the realities of 
board life.  
B. INDEPENDENCE VS. EXPERTISE? 
Reforms also impose responsibilities on the board without 
a careful consideration of how, and to what extent, directors 
will have the expertise to carry out those duties. Only one 
reform references director expertise.155 The new SEC disclosure 
rules now require companies to disclose the “experience, quali-
fications, attributes or skills” of all board nominees and direc-
tors every year.156 However, other rules are not only silent on 
this issue,157 but may potentially undermine director expertise.  
 
 151. See supra Part I.A.4. 
 152. See supra note 127 and accompanying text (discussing the notion that 
shareholders’ enhanced rights require enhanced interaction between the board 
and its shareholders). 
 153. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. at 56,765. 
 154. See id.  
 155. See Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334, 68,342 (Dec. 
23, 2009). 
 156. Id. 
 157. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
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In particular, reforms that focus on director independence 
could prove counterproductive. Indeed, all public company 
compensation committees must now consist entirely of inde-
pendent directors.158 On the one hand, this new mandate may 
appear unremarkable. Indeed, this mandate parallels the one 
encompassed in SOX for audit committees.159 Moreover, this 
mandate appears to codify existing listing standards which re-
quire compensation, audit, and nominating committees to con-
sist of independent directors.160 In the vast majority of public 
companies, not only are most board committees comprised sole-
ly of independent directors, but almost all board members are 
independent.161 In 2007 the average board only had two direc-
tors who were not independent.162 As a result, reforms in this 
area do not appear to break any new ground.  
On the other hand, such reforms further legitimize the 
presumption in favor of board independence without a full ap-
preciation of the potential drawbacks associated with that in-
dependence.163 Evidence on the benefits of independence both 
with respect to the entire board and with respect to certain 
committees is equivocal. Some empirical studies support the 
notion that independent directors improve corporate perfor-
 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 952, 124 Stat. 1376, 1900–03 (2010). 
 158. Id. 
 159. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat. 745, 
775–77. 
 160. See NASDAQ, INC., NASDAQ LISTING RULES, rs. 5605(c) (audit com-
mittee), 5605(d) (compensation committee), 5605(e) (nominating committees) 
(2009), available at http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com/NASDAQ/pdf/new_listing_ 
rules.pdf; NYSE, INC., NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL §§ 303A.07 (audit com-
mittee), 303A.05 (compensation committee), 303A.04 (nominating committee) 
(2009), available at http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCMTools/PlatformViewer.asp? 
selectednode=chp_1_4_3&manual=%2Flcm%2Fsections%2Flcm-sections%2F; 
see also NYSE AMEX, INC., NYSE AMEX L.L.C. COMPANY GUIDE §§ 803 (audit 
committee), 804 (nominating committee), 805 (compensation committee) (2008), 
available at http://wallstreet.cch.com/AMEXtools/PlatformViewer.asp?Selected 
Node=chp_1_1_8&manual=/AMEX/CompanyGuide/amex-company-guide/. 
 161. See Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Between 
Board Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231, 
239 (2002) [hereinafter Bhagat & Black, Long-Term Performance]; Jeffrey 
Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: Of 
Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1476 
(2007); KORN/FERRY INST., supra note 132, at 6, 19 tbl.D. 
 162. See KORN/FERRY INST., supra note 132, at 6. 
 163. See Cunningham, supra note 144, at 494–97 (2008) (discussing the 
“curious” pattern of rewarding independence over expertise). 
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mance.164 Moreover, some studies find that boards comprised of 
independent directors perform better at particular tasks such 
as firing a poorly performing CEO165 and detecting fraud.166 
Other studies reveal that greater independence on the audit 
committee improves financial reporting,167 while reducing the 
incidence of abusive accounting practices.168  
By contrast, some studies find no significant correlation be-
tween enhanced director independence and corporate perfor-
mance.169 In addition, a study of nominating, audit, and com-
pensation committees found little evidence that complete 
independence on those committees positively impacted a com-
pany’s performance.170 Studies also indicate that independent 
directors may not be more effective at discrete tasks such as 
monitoring companies in financial distress.171 More importantly 
for purposes of the current reforms, studies indicate that inde-
pendent directors may not have an impact on curtailing CEO 
compensation.172 Then too, no study supports the proposition 
that a supermajority of independent directors will produce bet-
ter corporate performance.173  
While scholars disagree with respect to the weight that 
should be given to various studies, even proponents of en-
hanced director independence acknowledge that the empirical 
evidence on the benefits associated with independent directors 
 
 164. See, e.g., Robert A. Prentice & David Spence, Sarbanes-Oxley as Quack 
Corporate Governance: How Wise Is the Received Wisdom?, 95 GEO. L.J. 1843, 
1866 (2007); Sanjai Bhagat & Brian Bolton, Sarbanes-Oxley, Governance and 
Performance 17 (Mar. 17, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http:// 
ssrn.com/abstract=1361815. 
 165. See Michael S. Weisbach, Outside Directors and CEO Turnover, 20 J. 
FIN. ECON. 431, 444, 452–54 (1988). 
 166. See Hatice Uzun et al., Board Composition and Corporate Fraud, 60 
FIN. ANALYSTS J. 33, 39 (2004). 
 167. Prentice & Spence, supra note 164, at 1872–73. 
 168. See Bhagat & Bolton, supra note 164, at 19 (finding financial expert di-
rectors are not busier and thus not associated with weaker corporate govern-
ance). 
 169. E.g., Bhagat & Black, Long-Term Performance, supra note 161, at 
231, 263. 
 170. See April Klein, Firm Performance and Board Committee Structure, 41 
J.L. & ECON. 275, 300–01 (1998). 
 171. E.g., Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Be-
tween Board Composition and Firm Performance, 54 BUS. LAW. 921, 932–33 
(1999) [hereinafter Bhagat & Black, Uncertain Relationship]. 
 172. See Bhagat & Black, Long-Term Performance, supra note 161, at 235. 
 173. See id.; Bhagat & Black, Uncertain Relationship, supra note 171, at 
922–23. 
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is mixed, if not “weak at best.”174 Moreover, studies indicate 
that factors beyond director independence may explain the pos-
itive relationship between such independence and improved 
corporate performance.175 
Even if independent directors produce some benefits for the 
corporation, such benefits must be weighed against costs that 
may undermine reform goals. Indeed, independent directors by 
their very nature are not employed by the company and, hence, 
have no first-hand knowledge of the day-to-day affairs of the 
corporation.176 Moreover, currently there is no requirement 
that directors have any industry-specific knowledge about the 
company on whose boards they serve.177 Thus, while many di-
rectors may have knowledge about business matters more gen-
erally, there is nothing to ensure that they have knowledge re-
garding the particular industry or the specific company on 
whose board they sit.178 This suggests that even as we impose 
additional responsibilities on directors, those directors may not 
have the expertise necessary to effectively grapple with those 
responsibilities.  
In addition, it is possible that shareholder reforms exacer-
bate this expertise problem in at least three respects. First, by 
enabling shareholders to determine who is nominated to the 
board, proxy access creates the possibility that shareholders 
will elect directors without the skill-set to tackle important 
problems, or that the overall board will not have the appropri-
 
 174. Gordon, supra note 161, at 1500; see also Prentice & Spence, supra 
note 164, at 1864, 1867 (“[The evidence is] decidedly mixed, [and thus] one 
cannot claim the empirical evidence clearly indicates that more independent 
boards will produce better financial results.”). 
 175. Bhagat & Bolton, supra note 164, at 4. 
 176. See Clarke, supra note 137, at 79; Rodrigues, supra note 137, at 
460 n.66. 
 177. Statutes give boards the discretion to determine director qualifica-
tions. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (Supp. 2010) (same); MODEL BUS. 
CORP. ACT § 8.02 (2009) (enabling director qualifications to be set forth in the 
bylaws or charter). While SOX requires that at least one member of the audit 
committee be a “financial expert,” see Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 
107-204, § 407(a), 116 Stat. 745, 790, the new rules do not dictate any further 
director qualifications. See also Laurie B. Smilan, The New Enhanced Disclo-
sure Rules—Ready, Set, Change and Now, in AUDIT COMMITTEE WORKSHOP 
2010, at 611, 630 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No 
23,982, 2010), available at WL 1820 PLI/Corp 611. 
 178. See Margaret A. Bancroft, Knowledge is Power: What Went Wrong in 
the Mutual Fund Industry, 1 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 145, 154–55 (2006) (noting that 
independent directors do not even have experience relevant to the industry, let 
alone specific experience related to the company on whose board they serve). 
  
2011] GOVERNMENT GOVERNANCE 1719 
 
ate mix of skills necessary to perform its responsibility.179 
Second, by potentially increasing the number of contested elec-
tions or otherwise increasing directors’ election vulnerability, 
enhanced shareholder rights may discourage qualified candi-
dates from serving on boards, thereby reducing the overall pool 
of qualified candidates available for board service.180 Third, 
campaigns aimed at increasing majority voting and decreasing 
classified boards increase the possibility that directors will 
serve for shorter terms,181 making it more difficult to create a 
group of board members with a long-term knowledge of the 
company and the industry. 
To be sure, these possibilities are not an inevitable by-
product of increased shareholder power. Instead, it is possible 
that the new rules may have relatively little impact on direc-
tors’ willingness to serve. Moreover, such rules may enhance 
the overall quality of boards by increasing the diversity of 
board candidates.182 
Nonetheless, like the overburdening problem, the possibili-
ty that boards will not have the expertise to carry out their 
functions could undermine their ability to sufficiently fulfill 
those functions. Indeed, new reforms not only require directors 
to fulfill an increased amount of responsibilities, but also re-
quire them to attend to different types of issues ranging from 
shareholder-related concerns to those involving risk assess-
ments. Such requirements certainly raise the possibility that 
directors may not be equipped to sufficiently address the com-
plete range of issues on which they are now being asked to fo-
cus. 
C. IMPLICATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH OUTSIDE ADVISORS 
Reforms also increase the possibility that boards will undu-
ly rely on management, advisors, and outside consultants in a 
manner that could have significant negative repercussions. 
This possibility could emerge in a variety of ways. First, the 
mere fact that boards may feel overburdened could prompt 
them to rely more heavily on outsiders and management in or-
 
 179. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 
56,765–66 (Sept. 16, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249) 
(detailing concerns). 
 180. Id. at 56,765. 
 181. See Fairfax, supra note 84, at 61–71 (discussing trends related to ma-
jority voting and classified boards). 
 182. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. at 56,766. 
  
1720 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [95:1692 
 
der to alleviate that burden. Second, anecdotal and other evi-
dence suggest that when directors believe that they lack the 
necessary expertise to grapple with particular issues, they tend 
to rely more heavily on managers and other advisors perceived 
to have such expertise.183 From this perspective, it is no sur-
prise that the growing influence of compensation consultants184 
coincides with the increased emphasis on independent directors 
who often may feel ill equipped to tackle the complexities of 
compensation matters. Finally, increasing shareholders’ power 
also may increase the potential for enhanced reliance on out-
side consultants such as proxy and advisory firms. Sharehold-
ers tend to rely on such firms for voting and other advice be-
cause the firms are perceived to have more resources and to be 
better informed about issues on which shareholders must cast 
their vote.185 Shareholders’ reliance on these firms impacts 
boards because boards look to such firms for cues regarding 
shareholder preferences.186 In this manner, increased share-
holder voice increases the likelihood that these firms will play a 
more central role in board decisionmaking.187  
To be sure, reliance on managers and outside advisors may 
be beneficial. Indeed, one should expect that directors would re-
ly on outsiders to help educate them on particular issues, or to 
fill the gap in their own knowledge base.188 Importantly, re-
forms expect and even encourage such reliance.189  
 
 183. See Susan J. Stabile, Viewing Corporate Executive Compensation 
Through a Partnership Lens: A Tool to Focus Reform, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
153, 175–76 (2000); Randall S. Thomas, Explaining the International CEO Pay 
Gap: Board Capture or Market Driven?, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1171, 1191–92 
(2004) (noting that compensation committees hire expert compensation con-
sultants to assist with its tasks). 
 184. See Lucian Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in 
the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 768 (2002); Fo-
gel & Geier, supra note 7, at 62 n.125; Mary-Hunter Morris, The Price of Ad-
vice, 86 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 153, 176–77 (2009); Randall S. Thomas, 
Should Directors Reduce Executive Pay?, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 437, 466–67 (2003). 
 185. See Stephen Choi et al., Director Elections and the Role of Proxy Advi-
sors, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 649, 655 (2009) (noting the tendency of shareholders to 
rely on proxy services who are perceived to have more specialized expertise 
with respect to voting issues); Gordon, supra note 21, at 351–52. 
 186. See Choi et al., supra note 185, at 653. 
 187. See Gordon, supra note 21, at 352 (“The propensity of many U.S. insti-
tutional investors to delegate such decisions could well give power to a handful 
of proxy service firms to make substantively very important decisions with po-
tentially economy-wide ramifications.”). 
 188. See Choi et al., supra note 185, at 655. 
 189. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 952, 124 Stat. 1376, 1900–03 (2010) (providing for di-
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However, significant reliance on management and advisors 
raises its own set of problems. First, there always exists the po-
tential that directors may inappropriately defer to such deci-
sions.190 Such deference could mean that directors fail to suffi-
ciently criticize or probe decisions made by third parties.191 In 
this way, directors’ reliance could lead to the kind of rubber 
stamping of critical decisions that reforms are aimed at pre-
venting.  
Second, directors’ increased reliance on advisors could neg-
atively impact the performance of board duties because such 
advisors may have conflicts of interests that undermine reform 
goals. Indeed, studies reveal that advisors can have conflicts of 
interest resulting from their dual role of both establishing 
guidelines in a given area while also providing advice with re-
spect to particular decisions in that same area.192 Reflecting 
such conflicts, a 2007 report commissioned by the House of 
Representatives revealed a pervasive level of conflicts of inter-
ests among compensation consultants.193 Such conflicts raise 
transparency issues. Indeed, according to the report, not only 
did companies fail to disclose the extent of such conflicts, but 
often companies identified consultants as independent even 
when other information suggested the existence of conflicts.194 
Furthermore, the report indicated that conflicted consultants 
worsen problems associated with excessive or inappropriate ex-
ecutive compensation.195 Thus, companies with highly con-
flicted consultants paid their CEOs a median salary sixty-seven 
percent higher than the median salary of companies that had 
 
rector engagement of compensation consultants, independent legal counsel, 
and other advisors). 
 190. See Fogel & Grier, supra note 7, at 62; Morris, supra note 184, at 176–
77; Stabile, supra note 183, at 175–76; Thomas, supra note 184, at 467. 
 191. See Choi et al., supra note 185, at 650. 
 192. See id. at 657–58; Gordon, supra note 21, at 352–53. 
 193. See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND GOV’T REFORM, 110TH 
CONG., EXECUTIVE PAY: CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AMONG COMPENSATION 
CONSULTANTS, at i, 4 (Comm. Print 2007), available at http://www.erieri.com/ 
PDF/Executive-Consultant-Conflicts.pdf (noting that over one hundred For-
tune 250 firms hired compensation consultants that have been hired by corpo-
rate management to provide other services to the company, and that often the 
amount the consultants earned for these other services far outstripped the 
amount earned for compensation advice). 
 194. See id. at 5. 
 195. See id. at 6. 
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hired consultants without such conflicts.196 Then too, the me-
dian CEO salary increased at a higher pace in companies with 
conflicted compensation consultants.197 To be sure, reforms aim 
to reduce conflicts related to compensation consultants by en-
hancing the independence criteria associated with such consul-
tants.198 However, it is not clear if such criteria will have their 
desired effect. In addition, no such criteria exist for proxy firms 
and similar advisors, despite concerns about their potential 
conflicts of interest.199 Thus, it remains possible that consul-
tants can pose conflicts that prevent reforms from achieving 
their goal. As a result, undue reliance on such consultants is 
especially troubling.  
Third, reliance on such advisors may increase the potential 
for one-size-fits-all solutions that could negatively impact cor-
porations and undermine the effectiveness of reforms. Several 
commentators have expressed concern that overreliance on 
compensation consultants could lead corporations to “homoge-
nize” compensation practices.200 Studies associated with the 
United Kingdom reveal that such homogenization has oc-
curred.201 While there may be some practices that are applica-
ble across companies, it is likely that standardizing certain 
practices would lead to suboptimal compensation practices at 
some companies.202 Such a possibility suggests that an undue 
reliance on outside advisors could have unintended and nega-
tive consequences for reform goals. 
Finally, a heightened reliance on outside advisors may 
raise accountability concerns. Indeed, in the context of proxy 
advisors, several commentators have expressed fear that such 
advisors have an inordinate amount of power without sufficient 
accountability for how they wield that power.203 While this fear 
 
 196. See id. The median salary of CEOs with highly conflicted consultants 
was $12.5 million as opposed to $7.5 million for CEOs with nonconflicted con-
sultants. Id. 
 197. See id. at 7 (demonstrating that the median CEO salary increase of 
the most highly conflicted consultants rose by 226 percent over a five-year pe-
riod, as compared to 105 percent amongst nonconflicted CEOs). 
 198. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 952, 124 Stat. 1376, 1900–03 (2010). 
 199. See Choi et al., supra note 185, at 657–58. 
 200. See Gordon, supra note 21, at 347–48; Lund, supra note 22, at 130–31. 
 201. See Davis, supra note 28, at 51. 
 202. See Lund, supra note 22, at 130–32. 
 203. See Choi et al., supra note 185, at 657–58 (pinpointing concerns). 
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may be exaggerated,204 it nevertheless underscores the fact 
that outside advisors are not accountable to shareholders or 
other corporate constituents. In this respect, reliance on those 
advisors creates the potential for an environment of reduced 
accountability at odds with reform goals.  
D. CONCLUDING ASSESSMENTS 
This Part demonstrates that reforms may have overesti-
mated directors’ ability to grapple with the variety of new re-
sponsibilities imposed upon them. Indeed, the board is com-
posed of a small group of people with significant outside 
obligations. Reforms enhance those obligations without assess-
ing whether directors have the ability to effectively perform 
them. Moreover, reforms require directors to tackle increasing-
ly complex issues without any discussion regarding whether 
they have the necessary expertise. As a result, reforms may en-
courage directors to unduly rely on management and outside 
advisors. This Part reveals that reforms raise legitimate con-
cerns regarding whether we can expect directors to carry out 
their new roles with the kind of diligence and rigor needed to 
avoid the next calamity, or if we have simply set boards up for 
failure in this regard. 
III.  THE FIDUCIARY DUTY MISMATCH   
This Part focuses on the fiduciary duty concerns raised by 
increasing directors’ responsibilities with respect to compensa-
tion and risk. As this Part will demonstrate, directors’ liability 
risk appears to be at odds with reform goals, particularly to the 
extent those goals seek to enhance director accountability or 
otherwise incentivize directors to more effectively fulfill their 
monitoring role. 
A. DIRECTOR DUTIES AND THE RARITY OF LIABILITY  
Under Delaware law, the risk that directors will be held 
personally liable for breaching their fiduciary duty in connec-
tion with compensation-related decisions is exceedingly low.205 
Importantly, the leading and most comprehensive empirical 
study on outside director liability makes clear that, as a gener-
al matter, directors’ risk of personal liability with respect to 
 
 204. See id. at 696. 
 205. See Bernard Black et al., Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN. L. REV. 
1055, 1062 (2006).  
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paying legal expenses or damages either in connection with 
judgments following a shareholder suit or a settlement agree-
ment is relatively low, making such liability a “rare occur-
rence.”206  
This observation is especially apropos with respect to com-
pensation matters. Indeed, in light of directors’ express author-
ity to determine the compensation of officers and agents,207 
courts grant them wide discretion in this area.208 That discre-
tion protects director decisions even if they can be character-
ized as ill-advised or poorly timed.209 Thus, a board or compen-
sation committee decision will be protected even if it falls “far 
short of corporate governance ‘best practices.’”210 In fact, unless 
such decisions can be defined as fraudulent or unconscionable, 
directors will not be held liable for them.211 Boards’ discretion 
in this area extends to their ability to rely on others who may 
have expertise in compensation matters.212 Reasonable reliance 
on compensation consultants or other experts often insulates 
boards from seemingly ill-advised compensation decisions.213 In 
light of these realities, it is extremely difficult to hold directors 
liable for compensation decisions. 
A similar pattern emerges with respect to allegations in-
volving breach of directors’ duty to oversee risk. As an initial 
matter, Delaware courts have made clear that seeking to hold 
 
 206. See id. 
 207. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(5) (2001). 
 208. See White v. Panic, 783 A.2d 543, 553 (Del. 2001); Brehm v. Eisner, 
746 A.2d 244, 262 (Del. 2000); Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1214–15 (Del. 
1996); Litt v. Wycoff, No. Civ.A. 19083-NC, 2003 WL 1794724, at *6 (Del. Ch. 
Mar. 28, 2003).  
 209. See, e.g., White, 783 A.2d at 553 (holding that strike-suit settlements 
were within the confines of the business judgment rule, without examining the 
merits of the allegations); Brehm, 746 A.2d at 262 (declaring that the burden 
was on plaintiff to rebut the presumption of validity of board action under the 
business judgment rule, where the board has followed expert advice); Grimes, 
673 A.2d at 1215 (declaring that the business judgment rule extends to the 
awarding of large severance packages to senior management); Litt, 2003 WL 
1794724, at *6 n.39 (deeming the distribution of bonuses well within the dis-
cretion of the board). 
 210. See In re Walt Disney Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 55 (Del. 2006). 
 211. See White, 783 A.2d at 553; Brehm, 746 A.2d at 262; Grimes, 673 A.2d 
at 1215; Litt, 2003 WL 1794724, at *6 n.39. 
 212. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (Supp. 2010) (“A member of the 
board of directors . . . shall . . . be fully protected in relying in good faith upon . 
. . opinions . . . the member reasonably believes are within such other person’s 
professional or expert competence . . . .”). 
 213. See Walt Disney, 906 A.2d at 60. 
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directors liable for breaching their oversight duty represents 
“possibly the most difficult theory in corporation law upon 
which a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment.”214 This diffi-
culty appears to be exacerbated when oversight claims involve 
allegations of improper risk assessments.215 Courts begin from 
the premise that directors have significant discretion to eval-
uate and determine their company’s risk appetite. As one Dela-
ware court noted, “[T]he essence of the business judgment of 
managers and directors is deciding how the company will eval-
uate the trade-off between risk and return.”216 That court then 
insisted that fiduciary duty law was “designed to allow corpo-
rate managers and directors to pursue risky transactions with-
out the specter of being held personally liable if those decisions 
turn out poorly.”217  
Based on this understanding of directors’ personal liability 
exposure in this area, the court expressed considerable doubt 
about the appropriateness of oversight cases alleging directors’ 
failure to properly manage risk, noting that it is “almost im-
possible” for a court to determine whether directors had proper-
ly evaluated risk.218 Thus, even if such a case could be brought, 
there would be an extremely high burden on plaintiffs “seeking 
to state a claim for personal director liability for a failure to see 
the extent of a company’s business risk.”219 Moreover, if a cor-
poration has an audit or risk management committee in place 
designed to report information with respect to risk, the exis-
tence of such a committee goes a long way toward shielding di-
rectors from liability.220 As a result, Delaware courts have indi-
cated that cases in this area would be almost impossible to 
win.221 As this suggests, under current law, directors’ liability 
exposure for breaches of their oversight responsibilities asso-
ciated with risk appears to be almost nonexistent.  
Directors’ relatively low risk of liability related to compen-
sation and risk seems at odds with federal reforms. In particu-
 
 214. See Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorp. v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 371 (Del. 
2006) (citing In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 
(Del. Ch. 1996)). 
 215. See In re Citigroup S’holder Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 106 (Del. Ch. 2009) 
(noting the high burden for claims related to oversight). 
 216. Id. at 126. 
 217. Id. at 125. 
 218. Id. at 126. 
 219. Id. at 125. 
 220. Id. at 127. 
 221. See id. 
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lar, it seems in tension with the apparent desire to hold direc-
tors more accountable for their actions in these areas. Indeed, 
many reforms appear to reflect a desire to increase the account-
ability of directors, especially for compensation and risk deci-
sions.222 In adopting proxy access rules, the SEC specifically 
noted that the financial crisis had generated serious concerns 
about the accountability of some companies and boards, “and 
whether boards need to be more accountable for their decisions 
regarding issues such as compensation structures and risk 
management.”223 Yet this section’s analysis of state fiduciary 
law makes clear that such law imposes no significant risk of 
personal liability for director duties related to such issues. As a 
result, one can be concerned about whether Delaware fiduciary 
law appropriately incentivizes directors to effectively perform 
their responsibilities related to risk monitoring or related to es-
tablishing appropriate compensation policies and practices.224 
In this regard, the lack of personal accountability inherent in 
Delaware fiduciary law seems to run counter to the expressed 
intent of reforms, reflecting an apparent disconnection between 
reform goals and that law. 
B. ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISM 
Of course, this appearance may be deceiving for at least 
three reasons. First, reforms may embody their own accounta-
bility mechanism, making reliance on state fiduciary law un-
 
 222. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 
56,669 (Sept. 16, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249); 
Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334, 68,334 (Dec. 23, 2009) 
(emphasizing the focus on corporate accountability in adopting rules related to 
compensation and risk oversight); Richard Hall & John White, A New Em-
phasis on Director Accountability, WHO’S WHO LEGAL (June 2010), http:// 
www.whoswholegal.com/news/features/article/28396/a-new-emphasis-director 
-accountability/ (discussing the focus on accountability throughout reforms); 
Sheppard Mullin, New TARP Executive Compensation Guidance and a Call for 
Further Reform in Compensation Practices, CORP. & SEC. L. BLOG (June  
18, 2009), http://www.corporatesecuritieslawblog.com/tax-new-tarp-executive 
-compensation-guidance-and-a-call-for-further-reform-in-executive-compensation 
-practices.html (noting that the Treasury Department aimed to promote ac-
countability through say-on-pay legislation and enhancements related to com-
pensation committees).  
 223. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. at 
56,669. 
 224. See, e.g., Eric J. Pan, A Board’s Duty to Monitor, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. 
REV. 717, 718 (2010) (arguing that by failing to hold boards of directors re-
sponsible for “harmful outcomes that do not involve wrongful or illegal acts 
. . . Delaware courts have encouraged boards to be uninformed of aggressive 
risk-taking by officers”). 
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necessary. Second, reforms may look beyond personal liability 
as a means for ensuring effective director accountability. Third, 
reforms may be relying on fiduciary duty law to adapt to the al-
tered environment. This section will evaluate these possibilities 
and demonstrate the manner in which each appears unconvinc-
ing.  
1. Shareholder Power as Accountability 
It is possible that reforms themselves serve to enhance di-
rectors’ accountability. In particular, it is clear that reforms 
aimed at increasing shareholder power also aim to enhance di-
rector accountability.225 This is especially true with respect to 
proxy access.226 Say-on-pay is also aimed at making directors 
more accountable for their compensation decisions.227 Similar-
ly, changes in broker voting rules have the goal of increasing 
director accountability.228 In this regard, it is possible that re-
forms sought to rely on increasing shareholder power as a 
means for ensuring director accountability. 
However, this possibility is problematic for several reasons. 
One, proxy access may never materialize, thereby undermining 
any expected increase in shareholders’ ability to hold directors 
accountable stemming from such access.229 Two, while there 
are other reforms aimed at increasing shareholder power, sev-
eral commentators have argued that those reforms may be 
flawed and hence may not meaningfully enhance shareholder 
rights.230 Indeed, some mechanisms continue to leave directors 
with significant discretion over voting matters, prompting the 
conclusion that any apparent grant of shareholder power is il-
 
 225. See Fairfax, supra note 7, at 2–3. 
 226. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. at 
56,669–70 (noting that proxy access was critical to holding boards accountable). 
 227. E.g., Elisse B. Walter, SEC Comm’r, Restoring Investor Trust 
Through Corporate Governance, Remarks Before the Practising Law Institute 
(Feb. 18, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch021809 
ebw.htm (noting that say-on-pay promotes increased accountability of board 
members and corporate management). 
 228. See Order Approving Proposed Rule Change to Amend NYSE Rule 
452, Exchange Act Release No. 34-60215, 12 n.34, 14 (July 1, 2009), available 
at http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nyse/2009/34-60215.pdf (noting that broker-
voting rule changes were important for ensuring director accountability in the 
election process). 
 229. See Fairfax, supra note 101, at 1268–69. 
 230. See, e.g., id. at 1261; William K. Sjostrom & Young Sang Kim, Majori-
ty Voting for the Election of Directors, 40 CONN. L. REV. 459, 461–63 (2007). 
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lusory.231 This means that any increase in director accountabil-
ity associated with those mechanisms may also be illusory. 
Even the SEC has recognized that these other mechanisms fall 
short of enhancing shareholders rights and thus fall short of ef-
fectively bolstering director accountability.232 Three, relying 
solely on increased shareholder power to increase board ac-
countability seems ill-advised for several reasons, including the 
tendency of shareholders to be apathetic as well as the poten-
tial that shareholders will advance concerns at odds with the 
best interests of the corporation.233 These reasons may blunt 
the ability of shareholders to exercise their power adequately or 
effectively. In this regard, an exclusive reliance on increased 
shareholder power as a means for holding directors accountable 
seems troubling. 
2. Extralegal Sanctions and Accountability 
It is also possible that reforms seek to depend upon mech-
anisms beyond personal liability to ensure accountability. 
Many argue that personal liability is not the only, nor the most 
effective, means of holding directors accountable for their ac-
tions.234 Instead, they argue that extralegal devices such as the 
market and directors’ concern for their reputations do a better 
job of ensuring that directors pay heed to their duties.235 The 
existence of these devices suggests that reforms may not pose 
an accountability conundrum. 
However, such a suggestion is unconvincing given that re-
forms reflected clear dissatisfaction with the status quo as it 
 
 231. See Sjostrom & Kim, supra note 230, at 463 (referring to majority vot-
ing as “smoke and mirrors”). 
 232. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 
56,670–72 (Sept. 16, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249). 
 233. See, e.g., Anabtawi, supra note 86, at 577; Bratton & Wacthter, supra 
note 86, at 653. 
 234. See Black et al., supra note 205, at 1140 (noting the importance of 
market incentives and reputation in supplementing the limited deterrence of 
out-of-pocket liability for directors); Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and 
Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 1265–68 (1999) (noting that directors 
adhere to their duties based on reputational threats); David M. Phillips, Prin-
ciples of Corporate Governance: A Critique of Part IV, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
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director conduct, and the undesirability of legal regulations); Larry E. Rib-
stein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 47–48 (2002) (defending a prefer-
ence for market-based solutions). 
 235. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 234, at 1265–68.  
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pertained to accountability.236 To the extent these other meas-
ures reflected that status quo, it seems curious that reforms 
would rely solely on them for accountability purposes. Moreo-
ver, even proponents of extralegal accountability measures ac-
knowledge that they may be insufficient on their own to pro-
mote director accountability.237 Instead, they must supplement 
some level of personal liability risk.238 Most importantly, while 
there may be disagreement about the optimal level of personal 
liability risk necessary to effectively promote director account-
ability, it seems relatively clear that reforms viewed the cur-
rent level as suboptimal.239 Reform’s failure to alter that level, 
therefore, appears to be in tension with reform goals. 
3. State Law Deference? 
It is also possible that reforms seek to rely on states to 
craft appropriate accountability mechanism that account for di-
rectors’ increased responsibilities. Most would agree that Del-
aware’s judiciary has developed an expertise in corporate af-
fairs that makes Delaware judges uniquely adept at responding 
to governance issues quickly and effectively.240 Moreover, some 
insist that the tasks of crafting appropriate responses to the 
crisis—including crafting appropriate accountability mechan-
ism—should be left to Delaware and other states, as opposed to 
the federal government.241 From this perspective, it is arguable 
that reforms appropriately left the fiduciary duty question open 
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so that states could grapple with the task of altering fiduciary 
duty norms to take account of the new regulatory environment. 
However, the probability that Delaware courts will alter or 
otherwise expand their conception of fiduciary duty as applied 
to risk and compensation seems extremely low. Delaware’s 
most recent pronouncement regarding directors’ risk of over-
sight liability occurred in the context of a case arising out of the 
financial crisis.242 Similarly, its analysis of director liability in 
the context of compensation arrangements occurred in the con-
text of a heightened concern about excessive executive compen-
sation.243 In both cases, the court appeared to resoundingly en-
dorse the status quo with respect to directors’ duties and 
liability risk in these areas despite a seemingly altered envi-
ronment related to these issues.244 Hence, the likelihood that 
Delaware will reconsider its longstanding fiduciary duty prin-
ciples seems remote.  
C. IMPLICATIONS 
What does this relatively low risk of personal liability 
mean? On the one hand, many have articulated why it makes 
sense for fiduciary duty law to ensure that shareholders must 
meet a relatively high threshold in order to hold directors liable 
for breaching their fiduciary duty.245 Indeed, imposing such lia-
bility involves a hindsight judgment that could be inappro-
priate and could undermine directors’ ability to make the kinds 
of risky decisions we might actually favor.246 Moreover, there 
are thorny issues involved with setting appropriate pay as well 
as divergent views about the appropriateness of particular pay 
structures. Thus, significantly enhancing directors’ risk of per-
sonal liability with respect to these decisions also involves 
hindsight judgments that may be inappropriate and count-
erproductive.247 
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On the other hand, the pendulum may have swung too far 
with respect to liability risk, resulting in a fiduciary duty re-
gime that does not incentivize directors to make efficient deci-
sions or otherwise hold them accountable for their failure to do 
so.248 Indeed, to the extent some threat of personal liability is 
necessary to supplement other forms of accountability mechan-
isms, it could be that the current threat level is simply too low.  
Ultimately, however, the lack of personal liability asso-
ciated with current fiduciary duty law diverges from reform ex-
pectations about accountability. Indeed, such reforms ex-
pressed frustration with the current accountability regime and, 
thus, clearly embody a desire to enhance directors’ accountabil-
ity beyond its current state. Fiduciary duty law fails to satisfy 
this desire, and it seems unlikely that the law will significantly 
change in the future. This suggests a need to reconcile the ap-
parent expectation of reforms with the limits embedded in laws 
necessary to support those reforms. 
Reforms do not seem to acknowledge or otherwise recog-
nize this limit. This lack of recognition raises questions about 
the ability of the reforms to achieve their goals, while challeng-
ing us to think critically about directors and effective measures 
for ensuring that they pay heed to their new duties. Indeed, we 
likely need to engage in a closer examination of fiduciary duty 
rules, including procedural roadblocks associated with bringing 
challenges under those rules. In addition, it could be that we 
need to expand the number of directors who serve on boards so 
that we can have more confidence about the board’s capacity to 
tackle their increased responsibilities and, hence, less concern 
that they will not have sufficient time for their new duties. In 
fact, it could be time to more seriously consider the notion of a 
professional director. Unfortunately, reforms did not grapple 
with any of these considerations. Instead, reforms continued 
the troubling shift, which began with SOX, of expanding the 
board’s role without meaningfully expanding the support and 
even incentives the board may need to carry out that role effec-
tively. 
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  CONCLUSION   
The financial crisis ushered in a wave of governmental re-
forms that intruded on board functions and responsibilities. As 
a result of those reforms, it is relatively clear that board duties 
have been dramatically enhanced. Hence, current and future 
boards will be charged with performing many more tasks be-
cause of the financial crisis and reform effort. 
However, because existing reforms failed to fully acknowl-
edge or grapple with the limitations associated with board 
functions and fiduciary duty, the board’s ability to effectively 
fulfill those tasks may be hampered. Moreover, there may exist 
no effective mechanism for ensuring that boards are held ac-
countable for failing to perform their new tasks.  
Ultimately, what is necessary is a more robust discussion 
of boards and their role in the modern corporation. To be sure, 
the federal government may not be in the position to fully en-
gage that discussion. However, at the very least, reforms may 
reflect the need for others to begin that engagement. 
